Abstracts Accepted

A Higher-Order-Thought Theory of Qualitative Consciousness 

Abstract:

I develop and defend a two-stage theory of qualitative consciousness - that is, of what it is for qualitative mental states to be conscious.  I begin by discussing what the problem of explaining consciousness consists in.  Against that background I then develop a theory of what it is for mental states of any sort to be conscious.  This theory posits higher-order thoughts (HOTs) that accompany every mental state that is conscious.  These HOTs suffice to make one aware of each conscious state, which is a necessary condition for any mental state to be conscious.  Though HOTs are seldom themselves conscious, they still result in awareness of our conscious mental states.

     I then briefly consider and rebut several arguments, due to Levine, Chalmers, and others, that no theory that appeals to such higher-order states can do justice to conscious qualitative character - what it's like for one to be in a conscious qualitative state.  In the course of that discussion I outline a theory of mental qualities that is independent of whether the relevant qualitative states are themselves conscious states.  That theory identifies mental qualities on the basis of their perceptual role, relying for each sensory modality on the quality space that defines the perceptible properties to which the modality in question enables perceptual access.  I conclude by showing how combining the HOT theory of a mental state's being conscious with the quality-space theory of mental qualities results in a satisfactory theory of qualitative consciousness that does not succumb to standard objections. 

Key-Words:
Mental qualities; Consciousness; Phenomenal consciousness, Phenomenology 

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*Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator of Cognitive Science
Affiliation:  Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA.
Email:  davidrosenthal@nyu.edu

Int Seminar MBC, Jan 2010. Accepted